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Abstract If valuations are interdependent and agents observe their own allocation
payoﬀs, then two-stage revelation mechanisms expand the set of implementable deci-
sion functions. In a two-stage revelation mechanism agents report twice. In the ﬁrst
stage - before the allocation is decided - they report their private signals. In the sec-
ond stage - after the allocation has been made, but before ﬁnal transfers are decided
- they report their payoﬀs from the allocation. Conditions are provided under which
an uninformed seller can extract (or virtually extract) the full surplus from a sale to
privately informed buyers, in spite of the buyers’ signals being independent random
variables.
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11 Introduction
Consider a seller of an object facing multiple, privately informed, bidders. Can the
seller extract all the surplus from the transaction? Crémer and McLean [3], [4]
(see also McAfee and Reny [8]) showed that full surplus extraction is generically
possible when bidders’ types are correlated random variables. Full surplus extraction
is achieved by conditioning the payment of each bidder on the realization of the types
of the other bidders. On the other hand, it is widely believed that if buyers’ types are
independent random variables, then full surplus extraction is not possible. This belief
is indeed correct in the case in which a bidder’s signal only aﬀects his own payoﬀ -
the case of private values. A standard example of private values is when agents have
private information about their own individual preferences.
In this paper I will show that, contrary to this widely held belief, full surplus ex-
traction is possible when valuations are interdependent, even if types are independent
random variables. Valuations are interdependent if the payoﬀ of an agent depends
not only on his own type, but also on the types (or informational signals) of the other
agents. This is the case, for example, when buyers have private information about the
quality of the good or service that the seller is trying to sell (e.g., in a mineral-rights
auction, bidders have private estimates about the quantity of minerals in the tract).
The important insight of this paper is that interdependence of valuations is a form
of correlation among bidders payoﬀs. This correlation can be exploited to achieve full
surplus extraction by using a two-stage revelation mechanism, in which bidders ﬁrst
report their signals, and then the winning bidder reports his realized allocation payoﬀ.
In the standard mechanism design model, agents only report their types to the
designer; they do not report their (pre-monetary transfer) payoﬀs from the allocation,
after an allocation has been made. Implicitly, standard mechanisms rule out the
possibility of transfers after an agent has observed his own payoﬀ from the allocation.
Two-stage mechanisms, which have been introduced by Mezzetti [11] to study eﬃcient
decisions, allow transfers to be made after a ﬁnal allocation has been determined.
2More precisely, the designer (the seller in this paper) sets up two reporting stages. In
the ﬁrst stage, the seller asks about the agents’ types. On the basis of these reports,
a winner is selected and partial transfers are made. After the winner has observed
his payoﬀ from the allocation of the object, the seller asks him to report his realized
payoﬀ in a second reporting stage. Then, ﬁnal payments from all bidders are collected
that are contingent on reports in both stages.
While with private values an agent cannot obtain any new information from the
observation of his allocation payoﬀ, with interdependent valuations observing his
realized payoﬀ provides the agent with new information about the types, or informa-
tional signals, of the other agents. In other words, even though types are independent
random variables, with interdependent valuations the realized payoﬀ of an agent is
c o r r e l a t e dw i t ht h et y p e so ft h eo t h e ra g e n t s .
I study two versions of the model. In the ﬁrst version, allocation payoﬀsa r e
deterministic functions of the type proﬁle. In this case, the allocation-payoﬀ report
of the winning bidder allows the seller to detect and punish ﬁrst-stage lies by the
losing bidders. In the second version, allocation payoﬀs are random functions of the
type proﬁle. In this version, the seller can use lotteries analogous to the ones used in
Crémer and McLean [3], [4], but based on the payoﬀ report of the winning buyer, to
extract the full surplus from the agents. A diﬀerence with the mechanism introduced
by Crémer and McLean is that, in order to fully exploit the correlation between
allocation payoﬀs and agents’ signals, the two main results of this paper (Theorems
2 and 3) require that the object be allocated randomly, and hence ineﬃciently, with
positive probability. This ineﬃciency is associated with a loss of surplus to the seller,
but this loss can be made arbitrarily small by making the probability of a random
allocation arbitrarily small. The object must be allocated randomly so that, with
positive probability, the designer will be able to use the second-stage allocation-payoﬀ
reports of all the other agents to cross-check the ﬁrst-stage type report of any given
agent i.
3The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Sections
3 and 4 contain the full surplus extraction results; Section 5 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
An uninformed seller of a single item, agent 0,f a c e sn prospective buyers. Each buyer
has private information about his own type, or signal, θi ∈ Θi.L e tΘ = × n
i=1Θi be the
set of signal proﬁles, θ =( θ1,...,θn) a generic element of Θ,a n dθ−i ∈ Θ−i = × j6=iΘj.
Types are drawn independently across agents; that is, the θi’s are independent random
variables.
Ad e c i s i o nx =( x0,x 1,...,xn) is a probability vector; xi is the probability that
agent i gets the object. Buyer i’s utility function Ui : X × Ω × Rn+1 → R depends






i is buyer i’s payment to the seller when the item is allocated to agent j.T h es t a t e
of the world is a random variable drawn from a probability measure that depends on







where vi(ω) is buyer i’s allocation payoﬀ when he gets the item and ω is the (realized)
state of the world; vi(·) is assumed to be a continuous and bounded function. The
allocation payoﬀ of a buyer that does not receive the object is normalized to zero
(there are no allocational externalities). The seller’s allocation payoﬀ v0(ω) is zero
for all ω.L e t t =( t1,...,tn). When the decision is x and the transfers are t,t h e









In many real world examples, agents observe their own realized allocation payoﬀs,
4and there are no obstacles to making ﬁnal transfers that are contingent on such an
observation. For example, after purchasing a good on ebay, or any other internet
auction site, buyers observe the quality of the good. After the purchase, buyers can
post feedback reviews of the seller. These reviews are accessible to future buyers and
thus determine the seller’s payoﬀ through reputational eﬀects.
In this paper, I will assume that if the item is allocated to buyer i =1 ,...,n,t h e n
for any realization of the state of the world ω,b u y e ri observes his realized allocation
payoﬀ vi(ω) before ﬁnal transfers are made.
Partial transfers can be made before the winning buyer observes his allocation
payoﬀ. In particular, in the mechanism I will propose the payment of the winning
buyer does not depend on the reported allocation payoﬀ, and thus can be made before
this is observed. Losing buyers, on the other hand, may have to make (or receive)
payments that depend on the allocation report of the winner.
Under private values, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the seller only
uses standard revelation mechanisms in which buyers are only asked to report their
signals (types). With interdependent valuations and observable allocation payoﬀs,
allowing the seller to collect messages in two reporting stages enlarges the set of
implementable decision functions. This is because the second-stage payoﬀ reports can
be used to cross check the ﬁrst-stage type reports. Thus, for example, while there
are no eﬃcient standard mechanisms when valuations are interdependent and signals
are multidimensional, independent, random variables (e.g., see Jehiel and Moldovanu
[6]), Mezzetti [11] shows that eﬃcient two-stage mechanisms always exist.1 In a two-
stage revelation mechanism, messages about the buyers’ signals are collected in the
ﬁrst stage and are used to determine the allocation of the item. After the agents have
observed their allocation payoﬀs they report them in the second stage; messages from
1More precisely, Jehiel and Moldovanu [6] show that if one restricts attention to one-stage mech-
anisms, then incentive compatibility is inconsistent with making eﬃcient decisions, even if one does
not impose any budget balancing or individual rationality constraint. Mezzetti [11] shows that
with two-stage mechanisms incentive compatibility, eﬃciency and budget balancing can always be
achieved.
5both stages are used to determine the total monetary transfers from the buyers to
the seller. Thus, a two-stage mechanism m = hx,ti consists of an allocation function
x : Θ → X,a n dn(n +1 )transfer functions t
j
i : Θ ×V j → R,w h e r ej =0 ,1,...,n,
i =1 ,...,n,a n dVj ⊂ R is the set of j’s feasible allocation payoﬀs when the item is
allocated to him (in this paper, the only agent who obtains new information from
observing his own allocation payoﬀ is the buyer who gets the item).2
In the next section, I will assume that signals are continuous variables and that
the state of the world coincides with the signal proﬁle, Ω = Θ. This version of the
model, in which allocation payoﬀs are deterministic functions of the type proﬁle,
called Model D, permits a more transparent presentation of the eﬀects at work with
interdependent valuations. When the player receiving the object observes his own
allocation payoﬀ, he may discover without doubt that some other player misreported
his type in the ﬁrst reporting stage. On the basis of the allocation payoﬀ reported
by the winner in the second reporting stage, the seller can then discover and severely
punish ﬁrst-stage lies of the losing buyers.
Section 4 studies a second version, Model R, in which the state space does not
coincide with the space of signal proﬁles, and allocation payoﬀs are random func-
tions of the type proﬁle.3 In this version, by observing his own allocation payoﬀ the
winner does not detect for sure that other players lied. Full surplus extraction is
still possible, however, because the interdependence of valuations implies that the
(random) allocation payoﬀ of the winner is correlated with the types of all players.
The seller can then use lotteries like in Crémer and McLean [3], [4] to induce buy-
ers to truthfully report their types. Loosely speaking, the winner’s allocation payoﬀ
provides an informative signal about the types of the other buyers that allows the
seller to severely punish ﬁrst-stage lies about types. Both models have been used in
2Mezzetti [10] discusses the revelation principle and shows that studying two stage revelation
mechanisms is without loss of generality (see also Myerson [13]).
3 To keep the analysis comparable with Crémer and McLean [4], in this version of the model the
signal and state spaces are ﬁnite.
6the literature, (e.g., see Crémer and McLean [3], [4] and Gresik [5] for Model D, and
McLean and Postlewaite [9] for Model R).
3 Surplus Extraction in the Deterministic Model
In this section, I will study the case in which the set of states of the world coincides
with the set of type proﬁles.
Deﬁnition 1 In Model D:( i )T h es e t sΘi are closed and bounded subset of R; (ii)
Fi(θi) and F−i(θ−i)=
Q
j6=iFj(θj) are the cumulative probability distributions of θi ∈
Θi and θ−i ∈ Θ−i, respectively; (iii) The set of states of the world is Ω = Θ.
In Crémer and McLean [3], [4], full surplus extraction occurs at the interim level.
Each agent type participates in a lottery which leaves him with zero expected surplus.
In this section, I will derive conditions under which it is possible for the seller to
extract all the surplus ex-post (i.e., for all type realizations), in spite of signals being
statistically independent. It is useful to begin with a simple example that illustrates
the main idea.
Example 1. Consider the following special case of the auction model in Myerson
[12]. There is a single item for sale and two bidders (potential buyers). Bidder i
observes a private signal θi;t h eo t h e rp l a y e rr e g a r d sθi as a random variable with
uniform distribution over the interval [1,2].B u y e r i’s valuation for the object (the
allocation payoﬀ from receiving the object) is
vi(θ)=θi + αθj i 6= j, i,j =1 ,2,
where α ∈ (0,1) is a known parameter. Following Myerson [12], one can show that all
common auctions (e.g., a ﬁrst-price, a second-price (Vickrey), or an ascending auc-
tion) with no reserve price are optimal. Let θ
(1) =m a x {θ1,θ2} and θ
(2) =m i n {θ1,θ2}.
In a Vickrey or in an ascending auction, bidder i wins the object if θi = θ
(1),a n d
7pays a price p =( 1+α)θ
(2). Thus, by using a standard optimal auction the seller
does not extract the full surplus θ
(1) + αθ
(2).4
I now show that the seller could exploit the interdependence of valuations and
design a two-stage mechanism that extracts the full surplus. Consider the following
“shoot-the-liar” mechanism. Bidders are ﬁrst asked to report their signals (in the
ﬁrst reporting stage). The bidder who reports the highest signal wins the object, and
then is asked to report the value obtained from the object (in the second reporting
stage). The payment, or transfer, to the seller from bidder i, i 6= j,a saf u n c t i o no f






































where P>1 is a constant. To see that the incentive compatibility constraints for the
bidders are satisﬁed (i.e., that bidder i w a n t st or e p o r tt r u t h f u l l y ) ,n o t eﬁrst that ti
i
does not depend on i’s reported allocation payoﬀ vr
i. Hence, truthful reporting of his
realized allocation payoﬀ is optimal for the winning bidder, in the second reporting
stage. Suppose that bidder j truthfully reports his signal in the ﬁrst reporting stage,
and if he wins he then truthfully reports his realized valuation in the second reporting
stage. The expected payoﬀ to player i from reporting θ
r
















i − 1)(θi − θ
r
i) − P (2 − θ
r
i),
while i’s expected payoﬀ from truthfully reporting θ
r
i = θi is zero. Clearly, for P>1,
Ui is maximized by reporting truthfully in the ﬁrst stage, θ
r
i = θi.I nt h i st w o - s t a g e
4That Myerson’s optimal auction has no reserve price is due to the type support being [1,2].T h e
conclusion that Myerson’s optimal auction does not extract the full surplus is general.
8revelation mechanism, each bidder obtains a zero payoﬀ and the seller extracts the
full surplus for all type realizations.5
As this example makes clear, the seller is able to extract the full surplus if, in-
tuitively, potentially proﬁtable lies in the ﬁrst reporting stage can be detected with
positive probability, when buyers truthfully report their allocation payoﬀsi nt h e
second stage. In the next subsection, I will formalize this intuition by providing a
condition under which full surplus extraction is possible. Subsection 3.2 contains the
main result of this section; I will show that even when full surplus extraction is not
possible, virtual full surplus extraction can be obtained.
3.1 Full Surplus Extraction
Let s(θ)=m a x j=0,...,n vj(θ) be the full surplus associated with type proﬁle θ,a n dl e t
x∗(θi,θ−i) be an eﬃcient allocation rule:
x
∗
i(θi,θ−i) > 0 if and only if i ∈ arg max
j=0,...,n
vj(θi,θ−i).
An eﬃcient allocation rule guarantees that the sum of all players’ payoﬀsc o i n c i d e s
with the full surplus for all type proﬁles θ.( T h ee ﬃcient allocation is that the seller









be the seller’s revenue for the type proﬁle θ, when the mechanism used is m = hx,ti.
5The “shoot-the-liar” mechanism contains a discrete penalty jump for being discovered lying.


















































where γ > 0 is a constant.
9Deﬁnition 2 In the two-stage mechanism m = hx,ti, the seller extracts the full
surplus for all type realizations, if there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of m in
which the seller’s revenue r(θ;m) equals the full surplus s(θ) for all type proﬁles θ.
To extract the full surplus for all type realizations, the seller must use an eﬃcient
allocation rule. Furthermore, on the equilibrium path the seller should not charge the
losing bidders (i.e., their transfers should be zero) and must charge the winning bidder
i an amount equal to i0s valuation for the object, vi(θi,θ−i). With such equilibrium
transfers and without out of equilibrium penalties, a type θi that reports θ
0
i would



























is the expected allocation payoﬀ of buyer i of type θi when he reports θ
0
i,a l lo t h e r
players report truthfully, and the seller uses an eﬃcient allocation rule.
We now introduce an assumption that, as Theorem 1 shows, is necessary and
suﬃcient for the seller to be able to extract the full surplus for all type realizations.
Assumption 1 For all i =1 ,...,n,a n da l lθi,θ
0






i),t h e n
there exist a positive-measure set Θ
+
−i ⊂ Θ−i and a j 6= i such that (i) vj(θi,θ−i) 6=
vj(θ
0
i,θ−i) for all θ−i ∈ Θ
+








Assumption 1 requires that, if the lie θ
0
i is proﬁtable for type θi under the eﬃcient






i) > 0), then with positive probability the item
will go to another agent j (condition (ii)), whose observed allocation payoﬀ will be
inconsistent with the reported type of agent i (condition (i)). Under this assumption,
by cross-checking i’s type report with the other agents’ allocation reports, the seller
is able to detect with positive probability all proﬁtable lies by all agents. Note
10that, given that the number of agents is ﬁnite, if a proﬁtable lie θ
0
i for type θi can be
detected with positive probability, then there must be a j that detects it with positive
probability. However, the agent detecting the lies of agent i needs not be always the
same j; Assumption 1 allows j to diﬀer for diﬀerent values of θi, θ
0
i,a n dθ−i.
Condition (i) in Assumption 1 is satisﬁed if the valuation function of player j
is a strictly monotone function of the type of player i, a common assumption in
auction theory. Condition (ii) rules out that a type θi can make a report θ
0
i that
underestimates his expected payoﬀ from owning the object and guarantees that he
will always win it.
To extract the full surplus for all type realizations, the seller should use the follow-
ing shoot-the-liar mechanism. First, based on the ﬁrst-stage signal reports, the item
is allocated eﬃciently (i.e., given to the buyer with the highest valuation). Second,
the seller collects a transfer from the buyer i that obtains the item; this transfer,
which can be made before the winner observes his allocation payoﬀ,i se q u a lt ot h e
full value of the item to i, vi(θ
r). Third, the winning buyer reports his realized al-
location payoﬀ in the second reporting stage. If this report is inconsistent with the
type reports made by the other buyers in the ﬁrst stage, then all other buyers are
imposed severe (but bounded) ﬁnes.6 On the equilibrium path no buyer will lie, and
thus only the winning bidder will need to make a payment to the seller.
Theorem 1 In Model D, there is a two-stage mechanism in which the seller extracts
the full surplus from the agents for all type realizations, if and only if Assumption 1
6 A drawback of this shoot-the-liar mechanism is that in the second stage the winning buyer is
indiﬀerent between reporting his true allocation payoﬀ and reporting any other payoﬀ.A sar e s u l t ,
there might be additional equilibria that do not yield full surplus extraction. It is an open question
under which conditions more complex mechanisms that do not have this feature can be constructed.
See Brusco [2] for a study of unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in the
model of Crémer and McLean [4].
In a related paper, Bennouri and Falconieri [1] study a common-value auction with uninformed
bidders and bidders that receive independent signals before the auction. They show that, when
both informed and uninformed bidders are risk-neutral, the seller can extract the full surplus. This
can be done by always assigning all the objects to the uninformed bidders. As in the shoot-the liar
mechanism, the informed bidders are indiﬀerent between telling the truth and misreporting.
11holds.
Proof. (If) Consider a two-stage revelation mechanism that uses an eﬃcient decision























Suppose that all the agents j 6= i always truthfully report their signals in the ﬁrst
stage and their allocation payoﬀs, if they get the item, in the second reporting stage.
Since agent i’s transfer does not depend on his reported allocation payoﬀ,h eh a sn o
incentive to deviate from truthfully reporting it in the second stage. If agent i of type
θi truthfully reports his signal in the ﬁrst stage, then he gets zero total utility. If he
reports a type θ
0









































−i is the subset for which vj(θi,θ−i) 6= vj(θ
0













i) > 0, then,




























(Only if) Suppose Assumption 1 is violated. Then, there exists a buyer i and
signals θi and θ
0






i), (ii) for all buyers j 6= i and all
subsets Θ
+









12In any mechanism that extracts the full surplus for all type realizations, the winning
buyer must be charged his valuation for the object, as computed from the type re-
ports. Then, type θi proﬁts from reporting that his type is θ
0
i: the lie is discovered













i) > 0 implies that x∗
i(θ
0
i,θ−i) > 0 for a subset of Θ−i having
positive probability measure. Hence, the seller cannot extract the full surplus for all
type realizations.
3.2 Virtual Full Surplus Extraction
While there are important examples where it is satisﬁed, Assumption 1 is restrictive.
Even if valuations are fully interdependent (i.e., if they depend on the types of all
agents) it can be violated, as shown by the following modiﬁcation of Example 1.
Example 2. As in Example 1, there is a single item for sale and two buyers with
valuations vi(θ)=θi + αθj, α ∈ (0,1), but now buyer 1’s type has support [1,3],
while 2’s type has support [1,2]. For all types of buyer 1 in the set (2,3], buyer 1
can report θ
r
1 =2 ,m a k i n gs u r et h a tx∗
2(2,θ2)=0with probability one: this lie will
never be detected in a mechanism that uses an eﬃcient allocation rule. Assumption
1 is violated and full surplus extraction is impossible.
What prevents full surplus extraction in Example 2 is that a buyer can pay less
t h a nt h ef u l ls u r p l u sw h i l eb e i n gs u r et h a th ew i l lg e tt h eo b j e c t .I nb o t he x a m p l e s ,
if buyer j is given the item, then any lie by i will be discovered. The seller could
then induce truthtelling by assigning the item to each buyer with positive probability,
irrespective of the type reports. Knowing that with positive probability any lie will
be discovered and severely punished, buyers will report their true types. Since the
allocation will be ineﬃcient with positive probability, the seller will not be able to
extract the full surplus. However, the seller could extract the full surplus when the
allocation decision is eﬃcient and, by making the probability of a random allocation
13arbitrarily small, he could obtain a revenue arbitrarily close to the full surplus.
Deﬁnition 3 In the two-stage mechanism m = hx,ti, the seller extracts within ε of
the full surplus for all type realizations, if there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
m in which the seller’s revenue r(θ;m) is greater than s(θ) − ε for all type proﬁles
θ.T h es e l l e rc a nvirtually extract the full surplus for all type realizations, if for all
ε > 0 there is a mechansim m(ε) under which the seller extracts within ε of the full
surplus for all type realizations.
We now introduce an assumption, which is satisﬁed by Example 2, under which
the seller will be able to virtually extract the full surplus for all type realizations.
Assumption 2 For all i =1 ,...,n,a n da l lθi,θ
0






i),t h e n
there exists a positive-measure set Θ
+
−i ⊂ Θ−i and a j 6= i,s u c ht h a t ,vj(θi,θ−i) 6=
vj(θ
0
i,θ−i) for all θ−i ∈ Θ
+
−i.
Assumption 2 guarantees that, for every possible lie by agent i that is proﬁtable
under the eﬃcient decision rule, there is a positive probability that another agent j
would be able to detect the lie, if he were allocated the object. As in Assumption 1,
the agent detecting the lie need not always be the same, but may diﬀer for diﬀerent
values of θi, θ
0
i,a n dθ−i. Contrary to Assumption 1, which imposes condition (ii),
Assumption 2 does not require that it is eﬃc i e n tt oa l l o c a t et h eo b j e c tt ot h ea g e n t
that is able to detect the lie. Thus, Assumption 2 is strictly weaker than Assumption
1 . I f ,a si so f t e na s s u m e d ,vj(θi,θ−i) is a strictly monotone function of θi,t h e n
Assumption 2 holds, while Assumption 1 need not hold (it does not hold in Example
2). Furthermore, by the transversality theorem, given θi,θ
0
i ∈ Θi, θi 6= θ
0
i, for generic,
smooth, payoﬀ functions, the equalities vj(θi,θ−i)=vj(θ
0
i,θ−i) for all j 6= i only
hold for a zero-measure set of values of θ−i; that is, Assumption 2 holds for generic,
smooth, valuation functions vj : Θ → R.
The following theorem, the main result of this section, shows that if Assumption 2
is satisﬁed, then the seller can virtually extract the full surplus for all type realizations,
14by using a modiﬁed shoot-the-liar mechanism in which (i) the eﬃcient allocation is
implemented with a probability close to, but bounded away from, one, and (ii) each
player receives the object with small, but positive, probability.7
Theorem 2 In Model D, if Assumption 2 holds, then the seller can virtually extract
the full surplus for all type realizations.
Proof. In the ﬁrst stage, besides collecting signal reports from the bidders, the
designer observes the realization of a random variable Y that takes values y =0
with probability 1 − δ,a n dy =1with probability δ (the probability δ is chosen
by the designer). The allocation rule and transfer functions will also depend on the

















































Agents have no incentives to deviate in the second stage. If all the other agents always
truthfully report their signals in the ﬁrst stage and their allocation payoﬀsi nt h e




by truthfully reporting his signal in the ﬁrst stage. If he reports a type θ
0
i 6= θi,t h e n
7It is simple to show that even when Assumption 2 fails, by using two-stage mechanisms the seller

































































−i is the subset for which vj(θi,θ−i) 6= vj(θ
0







i) > 0, by Assumption 2, Θ
j
−i has probability measure greater than zero for at























This shows that truthful reporting is an equilibrium of the proposed mechanism. The
object is allocated eﬃciently with probability (1−δ), and randomly with probability δ
n
to each buyer; the seller only charges the winning buyer when the decision is eﬃcient.
This implies that the seller’s revenue is
r(θ;m)=( 1 − δ)max
i
vi(θ)
= s(θ) − δs(θ).





it is r(θ;m) >s (θ) − ε.
16In the mechanism used in the proof of Theorem 2, the only payment to the seller
is from the bidder receiving the object, when the decision implemented is eﬃcient.
In such a case the winner pays an amount equal to his valuation. With probability δ
the object is assigned randomly and the seller does not collect any payments.
Assumption 2 and Theorem 2 could be extended to the case in which θi is multi-
dimensional without any modiﬁcation.
4 Surplus Extraction in the Random Model
In the model of this section, observing his own allocation payoﬀ vi(ω) provides agent
i with a signal that is imperfectly correlated with the types θ−i of the other agents.
This implies that, even if the winning buyer truthfully reports his allocation payoﬀ,
the seller cannot be certain that a player lied in the type reporting stage. I will show
below, however, that, by using lotteries as in Crémer and McLean [4], the seller can
virtually extract the full surplus for all type realizations.
As m a l ld i ﬀerence with the deterministic case is that for any given type proﬁle θ,
the losers’ payments (which were zero in the deterministic case) will vary with the
actual realization of the state of the world ω (but will average out to zero over all
states of the world, conditional on the type proﬁle θ). To facilitate comparison with
Crémer and McLean [4], in this version of the model I will assume that the type and
s t a t es p a c e sa r eﬁnite.
Deﬁnition 4 In Model R:( 1 )T h es e t sΘi and Ω are ﬁnite; (2) fi(θi) > 0 and
f−i(θ−i)=
Q
j6=ifj(θj) > 0 are the probabilities of θi ∈ Θi and θ−i ∈ Θ−i;( 3 )g(ω|θ)
is the probability of ω conditional on θ,a n dg(ω|θi)=
P
θ−i∈Θ−i g(ω|θi,θ−i)f−i(θ−i)
is the probability of ω conditional on θi.
More notation is needed. Let vi(θ)=
P
ω∈Ω vi(ω)g(ω|θ) be the expected payoﬀ
of player i conditional on the type proﬁle being θ.L e tΩ(vi) be the set of states of
17the world ω for which vi(ω)=vi,a n dl e tVi = {vi ∈ R : ∃ω ∈ Ω s.t. vi(ω)=vi} be
the set of feasible allocation payoﬀsf o ra g e n ti. S i n c et h et y p es e t sΘi and the set
of states of the world Ω are ﬁnite, Vi is also ﬁnite; let ki be its cardinality. We can






ω∈Ω(vj) g(ω|θi,θ−i) be the probability that vj(ω)=vj, condi-







be the vector of
probabilities of j0sa l l o c a t i o np a y o ﬀs, conditional on θi and θ−i.N o t et h a tπj(θi,θ−i)
has dimension kj.
4.1 Virtual Full Surplus Extraction
Like in Model D, let s(θ)=m a x j=0,...,n vj(θ) be the full surplus associated with the
type proﬁle θ,a n dl e tx∗(θi,θ−i) be an eﬃcient allocation rule. The seller’s revenue











As in the previous section, the deﬁniton of virtual full surplus extraction for all type
realizations is given in Deﬁnition 3.
The following assumption is the appropriate adaptation of Assumption 2 to Model
R. It is close in spirit to the condition in Theorem 2 of Crémer and McLean [4]. As
we shall see, it ensures that the seller can virtually extract the full surplus for all type
realizations.








i,θ−i) for all θi ∈ Θi,a n da l lρi(θ
0
i) ≥ 0.
Assumption 3 is a joint restriction on the conditional distribution g(ω|θ) and the
payoﬀ functions of the agents. It says that, for all i and θ−i, there is a bidder j 6= i
such that j0sp a y o ﬀ-probability vector conditional on θ−i and θi is not a positive linear
18combination of all the other payoﬀ-probability vectors of bidder j, conditional on θ−i
and θ
0
i 6= θi.Iw i l ls a yt h a tj(θ−i) is the bidder cross-checking i at θ−i. The bidder
cross-checking i needs not always to be the same; j(θ−i) may diﬀer for diﬀerent values
of θ−i.
Since the probability vector πj(θi,θ−i) has dimension kj, Assumption 3 holds
g e n e r i c a l l yo n l yi f ,f o re a c hp l a y e ri, the set of possible payoﬀs Vj of another player
j 6= i h a sa tl e a s ta sm a n ye l e m e n t sa st h es e to ft y p e so fp l a y e ri.I ff o rap l a y e ri the
sets of possible payoﬀs of all other players j contains less elements than Θi (i.e., if kj is
less than the cardinality of Θi), then Assumption 3 cannot hold generically, because
it is always possible to write one of the kj dimensional allocation-probability vectors
πj(θi,θ−i) as a linear combination, and in a positive-measure number of cases as a
positive linear combination, of the other vectors πj(θ
0
i,θ−i),w i t hθ
0
i 6= θi.I n t u i t i v e l y ,
the set of states of the world must be suﬃciently rich relative to the set of agent types
for Assumption 3 to hold generically.
In the mechanism proposed by Crémer and McLean [3], [4], the seller fully extracts
the surplus by using an eﬃcient auction (e.g., a ﬁrst price, or a Vickrey auction),
augmented with a lottery (side-bet) for each type of each agent. The lottery stipulates
that an agent must make additional payments to the seller that depend on the types
reported by the other agents.
A similar approach can be followed when valuations are interdependent and deci-
sion payoﬀs are observable, even if the types θi are independent. Given the agents’
reported type proﬁle, the designer assigns the object according to the eﬃcient allo-
cation rule with probability 1 − δ,w i t hδ ∈ (0,1). With probability δ,t h eo b j e c ti s
randomly assigned, with each buyer obtaining the item with probability δ/n.T h e
agent who receives the object is asked to pay his expected allocation payoﬀ given the
reported types. When agent i does not get the object, he only pays if the winning
buyer is j(θ−i), the agent cross-checking i at θ−i.I ns u c hac a s e ,i must pay (or be
paid) an amount that depends on the reported allocation payoﬀ of the winning buyer.
19If Assumption 3 holds, these payments can be structured so that their expected value
is zero if agent i truthfully reports his type and it is arbitrarily high if he lies.
The important diﬀerence with Crémer and McLean is that this mechanism exploits
the correlation between the types of the agents and the random allocation payoﬀ of
the winning agent, rather then the correlation among the types of all agents. Another
diﬀerence is that, in order to fully exploit this correlation, with positive probability
the object is assigned randomly. This introduces an ineﬃciency, and hence a loss of
surplus to the seller, but this loss can be made arbitrarily small by lowering δ and
raising the stakes in the lotteries oﬀered to the losing buyers.8
The object must be allocated randomly for the same reason as for the virtual full
surplus extraction result in Theorem 2. In Crémer and McLean, the type reports of
all the other agents provide the designer with signals that are correlated with agent
i’s payoﬀ. In this paper, the designer only obtains a signal that is correlated with
agent i’s payoﬀ if some agent diﬀerent from i gets the object and reports his allocation
payoﬀ. Assigning the object randomly with positive probability guarantees that the
designer will be able to exploit as much as possible the correlation between types and
allocation payoﬀs.
If, after the allocation decision, the designer had access to a public signal correlated
with the true value of the object for the winning bidder, then the designer could
use lotteries for everybody (rather than just one of the losing bidders) to induce
truthtelling. Under appropriate conditions on the informativeness of the public signal,
the designer could extract the full surplus and would not need to resort to an ineﬃcient
allocation with positive probability. It is, however, much more natural to assume, as I
have done throughout this paper, that the winner’s allocation payoﬀ remains private.
Theorem 3 In Model R, if Assumption 3 holds, then the seller can virtually extract
the full surplus for all type realizations.
8 As in Crémer and McLean [3], [4] these lotteries may involve large prizes and penalties; see
Kosmopoulou and Williams [7] for a criticism of this feature of the mechanism.
20Proof. By Assumption 3 and Farkas’ Lemma, for any given i, θi and θ−i, there exists









such that the following scalar-product relations hold: (i) hj(θ−i)(θi,θ−i)πj(θ−i)(θi,θ−i) >
0,a n d( i i )hj(θ−i)(θi,θ−i)πj(θ−i)(θ
0
i,θ−i) · 0 for all θ
0
i 6= θi. Consider the two-stage






















































if j = j(θ
r
−i),
where µ>0,a n dj(θ−i) is the buyer cross-checking i at θ
r
−i,a sd e ﬁn e di nA s s u m p t i o n
3. First, note that the winning buyer has no incentive to deviate from telling the truth
in the second stage, because his transfer ti
i(·) does not depend on the second-stage
payoﬀ report. Then, suppose all types of bidders j 6= i truthfully report their signals
in the ﬁrst stage and their allocation payoﬀs in the second stage. Agent i of type θi
gets zero expected utility by reporting truthfully. To see this, note that, for a given
θ−i:( i )i’s payoﬀ is zero when he or a player j 6= j(θ−i) is allocated the object, and
(ii) by Assumption 3 and the deﬁnition of hj(θ−i)(θ),w h e nj(θ−i) obtains the object,














21On the other hand, if type θi of player i lies and reports θ
0
i, he will obtain a negative
expected payoﬀ provided that µ is suﬃciently large. To see this, note that, for a given
θ−i:( i )i gets a zero payoﬀ when a player j 6= j(θ−i) is allocated the object; (ii) i’s
payoﬀ is vi(θi,θ−i) − vi(θ
0
i,θ−i) when he obtains the object, and (iii) by Assumption
3a n dt h ed e ﬁnition of hj(θ−i)(θ),w h e nj(θ−i) obtaines the object, the expected value
of the transfer from buyer i to the seller, t
j(θ−i)





























Since vi(θi,θ−i) − vi(θ
0
i,θ−i) is bounded and j(θ−i) is allocated the object with a
probability of at least δ/n,b yc h o o s i n gµ suﬃciently large the seller can make sure
that a player that misreports obtains a negative expected utility. This shows that
truthful reporting is an equilibrium of the mechanism. Since the object is allocated
eﬃciently with probability (1 − δ) and randomly with probability δ
n to each buyer,
and the seller always charges the winning buyer his valuation, the seller’s revenue is


























it is r(θ;m) >s (θ) − ε.
225C o n c l u s i o n s
Some authors have criticized the full surplus extraction results of Crémer and McLean
[3], [4] as being counterintuitive (e.g., see McAfee and Reny [8] and Neeman [14]).
It is not the goal of this paper to contribute to the debate about the plausibility of
these results. This paper simply makes the theoretical point that, by using two-stage
mechanisms, the setting in which agents’ types are independent random variables and
valuations are interdependent is very similar to the setting in which agents’ types are
correlated random variables. This makes intuitive sense. After all, interdependency
of valuations is a form of correlation of the agents’ preferences. This point has been
missed in the previous literature, because attention has been restricted to mechanisms
i nw h i c ha l lt r a n s f e r sm u s tb em a d eb e f o r ea g e n t so b s e r v et h e i ro w na l l o c a t i o np a y o ﬀs.
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